other hand, in comparing it with his other works and le ers, I will come close to his nal stage, or limit, in so far as this is possible. So in my article, rstly, some interpretations about the backgrounds of Basil's Trinitarian teaching are brie y presented. On the basis of this outline, secondly, some arguments concerning various stages of the development of his Trinitarian thought will be speci cally outlined and compared. Thirdly, the argument in the main part of Epistle 38 will be analyzed in detail in order to exemplify the philosophical framework and strategy of this Cappadocian author's Trinitarian theology. Finally, some interpretations about the philosophical background of Basil's Trinitarian teaching are outlined. This article aims to cast light on some philosophical aspects of his Trinitarian thought.
Some Interpretations about the Background of Basil's Trinitarian Thought
The role which Basil played in fourth-century theology and ecclesiastical politics was prominent and signi cant, but never easy to clarify. Hence, rst of all, we will consider the theological background and the development of Basil's Trinitarian thought. Needless to say, this article cannot present such an extensive overview of the Trinitarian controversy of the fourth century, and this is not its aim. For the present purpose, I think, focusing on the concept of is the key to elucidating the development of Basil's Trinitarian thought in the la er half of the fourth century. In other words, our question is: was Basil the father of the neo-Nicene or pro-Nicene theology? If so, was Basil ever a Homoiousian? (Gö ingen, 1996) 297-331. In the former part of the 20th century, for example, G. L. P , God in Patristic Thought (London-Toronto, 1936) (Leiden-Boston-Köln, 2000) 61-93, insists that Ep. 38 corresponds to both Basil's later works and Gregory's teaching, so-called a common "Cappadocian" position.
According to the traditional view of Zahn 2 and von Harnack, 3 1) the term was originally associated with the controversy between monarchian and pluralistic understanding of the Trinity, and 2) the "neo-Nicene" theology (neo-Nicenism) nally reinterpreted and even revoked the original, unitarian meaning of the Nicene ; that is, to put it schematically, from at Nicaea in 325 as ("the same and one substance"), through the Synod of Ancyra in 358, to at Constantinople in 381 as ' ("like according to essence"). In this theory, the father of the neo-Nicene theology is Basil of Ancyra, as the leader of the Homoiousians, and not Athanasius nor Basil of Caesarea.
However, this theory is no longer held (of course, not unanimously, except in Germany, at least). Firstly, in the 350s, the existence of a party which independently can be called Nicene is extremely questionable. In the Synod of Antioch in 341, Athanasius, an advocate of the Nicene homoousion, was deposed, and those who supported its creed "probably found both Arius' language and the Athanasian/Marcellan theology unacceptable."
4 Homoousian (essence)-terminology disappeared from the forefront of history, and then homoiousian (likeness)-terminology assumed a central position. Therefore, secondly, it is impossible for Homoiousians, like Basil of Ancyra, to react against the Nicene homoousion which had already been repealed. According to recent research, those who prominently rose into power in the la er half of the 350s are the "Homoians," that is a pro-subordinationist group. They insisted that "the Son is 'like' (homoios) the Father although distinct and ontologically inferior." 5 Among them, especially, Aetius and his disciple Eunomius led the most subordinationist faction and were called "Anomoians," because they argued that the Father and the Son were "unlike" (anomoioi) according to essence. In contrast to them, the other bishops, who thought of the Son as "like the Father according to essence" and were thereby called "Homoiousians," were hostile to the Anomoians and gathered around Basil of Ancyra to promulgate homoousios as ' (like according to essence) in the 358 Synod at Ancyra. They were, however, deposed by radical Ho- to me to accord be er than "consubstantial" ( ). For light which has no di erence from light in the ma er of greater and less cannot be the same because each is in its own circumscription of existence ( ) but I think that "like in substance entirely without variation" ( ' ) could be said correctly.
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In this quotation, we can certainly nd the homoiousian phrase "like in substance" ( ' ). But, according to Prestige, Basil's position here is fully Athanasian taken in connection with Ep. 9, and the phrase "like in substance entirely without variation" amounts to the same thing as the homoousion.
10 On the other hand, according to Zachhuber's new elucidation, Basil's argument here seems to reject both the homoiousian approach and Athanasius' homoousian view, because it "is not his generation from the Father that accounts for the Son's divinity in the rst place, but the community of logoi: whatever can be said of the Father qua substance holds equally good for the Son too."
11 Whichever interpretation we follow, Basil's standpoint seems to be not simply homoiousian. What is more, he has not yet determinately elucidated a unity between the Father and the Son, or the personal distinction of Father, Son, and Spirit, either. In this regard, Basil's theology in these early years is obviously immature.
We will, then, turn to his Adversus Eunomium I and II dated about 363 or 364. In this phase of the development of his Trinitarian thought, applying the Stoic concept of to his own , Basil is able to logically ground the unity of the three hypostases on the unity of substance. For instance, in AE II, 14, ll.1-20: Yet, to this argument, who in his right mind would add, that they whose names are distinct, must necessarily di er also in their substances ( )? For the appellations ( ) of Peter and Paul and all persons in general are distinct, yet the substance of all is one. Hence we are identical to each other in most things; only (9) R. J. D (tr.), Basil. Le ers, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA, 1950) 335. Translations of all le ers are taken (with some minor changes) from De errari's edition.
(10) G. L. P , St Basil the Great and Apollinaris (London, 1956) 18. Additionally, the author insists that in the de Spritu sancto (45) "the real meaning of the monarchy was seen in a unity of ousia, though he [Basil] does not actually employ the term "identity" ( )" (P , God in Patristic Thought, 230).
(11) Z , Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa…, 53. Shigeki Tsuchihashi in terms of what are considered each one's peculiarities ( ) have we been made di erent one from the other. It follows that the appellations signify not the substances, but the properties which characterize ( ) each one. So that when we hear "Peter," we do not grasp ( ) his substance by means of his name (I here call "substance" the material subject ( ), which the name does not in the least signify), but we register the concept ( ) of what are considered his peculiarities. … So that the name, on the one hand, demarcates ( ) for us the character ( ) of Peter, but, on the other hand, it in no way represents ( ) the substance itself.
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In his early treatise, Ep. 361, Basil has o en used for particular substance. As a result of such an understanding, he has been faced with a dilemma concerning substance: if no substance can exist without its being in any person, the undivided divine substance subsists dividedly in each of three divine persons. Therefore, against the Neo-Arian who insisted on a distinction between the substance of the Father and of the Son, Basil had to shi the emphasis from particular to common . In the quotation above, then, he nds a solution to these di culties in the Stoic concept of as an inde nite substratum or material ( ). However, in Ep. 236 dated 376, late in his life, Basil has recourse to the Aristotelian distinction between and .
But substance and person ( ) have the distinction that the general ( ) has with reference to the particular ( ' ); for example, just as "a living creature" has with reference to "a particular man ( )." For this reason we confess one substance for the Godhead, so as not to hand down variously the de nition of Its existence ( ), but we confess a person that is particular ( ), in order that our conception ( ) of Father and Son and Holy Spirit may be for us unconfused and plain. … Therefore, we must add the particular to the general and thus confess the faith; the Godhead is something general, the paternity something particular, and combining these we should say: "I believe in God the Son." If, here, the distinction between and might be understood as the Aristotelian distinction between concrete particular existence (the primary substance) and common species (the secondary substance), a divine unitary shared nature would be not any essential principle, but an abstract and nominalistic universal. Can we nd out any suggestion to ease this concern about "the Aristotelian route"? My answer is "yes." So, let us explore that possibility, closely and specically analyzing Ep. 38, in the following section.
Philosophical Structure of Ep. 38
The reason this le er was wri en was that there was a tendency at that time, 14 which identi ed the conception of "person" ( ) with that of "substance" ( ). Many arguments over the doctrine of the Trinity "fail to discover any di erence between the general conception of substance ( ) and that of persons ( )" (1,1-2). 15 For this reason, some insist on the a ribution of one person ( ) to God; and others, vice versa, insist on the division of the substances ( ) into three. Hence in this section, we shall focus especially on the following development: from [1] the distinction between the proper and universal names or terms ( ), through [2] the -distinction, nally to [3] its application to the theory of Trinity. The point here is the identi cation of the relationship between and with the relationship between and . So the distinction of a universal concept from an individual concept is explained on the basis of the distinction of the species of "man" from individual men, such as Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy. 
The Distinction between Proper and Universal Names (Terms)
According to the Cappadocian author's semantic theory, 16 all names ( ) are divided into the following two classi cations: a) universal names, "which are predicated ( ) of subjects plural and numerically diverse, have a more general meaning ( )" (2,1-3). b) "other proper names have a very speci c denotation ( )" which indicates "a limitation to a particular thing ( )," "so far as the individuality of the object is concerned ( )"(2,11-15). We can take as an example, "man." "When you say 'man,' you thereby indicate ( ) the common nature ( )" (2,4) in distinction from individual men. It is by means of "a further note of distinction ( )" (2,10) that we understand, not merely man in general, but "Peter" or "John" in particular.
Now, we should notice that both proper names and universal names have a dual function: reference and signi cation. It seems clear that the proper name indicates a concrete thing ( ) in a deictic way, but, at the same time, it has another function to convey the notion ( / ) of individual things. In other words, the proper name signi es characteristic properties or peculiar notes ( / / ) of a particular thing, by which we can di erentiate it from others and identify it. On the other hand, the universal name not only has a deictic function to indicate the common nature ( ) as mentioned before, but also signi es common properties of all the individuals which we could call by the name. To put it di erently, a universal meaning of the thing predicated ( ) by the name is common to all alike ( ) who are included under the same name (2,8-9). The question we have to ask here is: what entity does the proper term's signi cation correspond to? What entity does the universal term's reference correspond to? The former entity is related to the particular or and the la er with the common or .
(16) For an a empt to nd out the modern and creative idea in Basil's semantics of proper names, cf. K , Basil of Caesarea…, 31-48.
The -Distinction
What is at the core of the understanding of the di erence between and is the consideration in the process of recognition, as below: Someone who says "man" causes in a hearer's mind "a sort of vague concept ( )" by means of "the inde niteness ( ) of the term used," so that "the nature ( ) of the thing is indicated by the name ( )," but "the thing which subsists ( )" (in that nature) and "is speci cally ( ) indicated by the name is not signi ed ( )" (3,2-6). On the other hand, someone who says "Paul" designates the nature ( ) which subsists ( ) in the object ( ) indicated by the name (3,6-8). It seems clear that this particular nature is a hypostasis.
First of all, what should be noticed is that only in 2,1-19 and 3,1-8, the author uses a pair of terms: name ( ) and nature ( ). Before and a er those lines in this context, however, he uses another pair of terms:
and . In the Epistle, the universal name is never used to indicate . With such a usage of terms, I think, the author deliberately develops an argument in a subtle way such that we can distinguish between the semantic or ordinary language level and the metaphysical or analytical knowledge level. This method, that is, a transition from a kind of vague whole which is more knowable for us by its name ( ) to a determinate formula ( ) by which principles become known to us, seems to be very similar to the Aristotelian method of physics. 17 In the following, I would like to elucidate a shi from a semantic stage of the relationship between and to a metaphysical stage of the relationship between and in an Aristotelian way. Firstly, although the common nature ( ) is indicated ( -) by the name, such as "man," vaguely (3,4-5), in the case of "the of men" an account ( ) is sought (2,21). According to the previously mentioned Aristotelian method, the common nature (17) Cf. Aristotle, Physica A1, 184a10-b14, esp., 184a21-b10: "Now what is to us plain and obvious at rst is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name ( ) to the formula ( )." which the name shows or indicates, but does not signify, is some sort of whole. Aristotle says, "a name, e.g. 'round,' means vaguely a sort of whole; its analyzes this into its particular senses." 18 Therefore, universal or common is, I should contend, humankind as sort of whole including its individuals, 19 such as Paul and John. Someone who says "man" can, for example, enumerate Paul and John as a man, but he does not know its principle or essence which causes something to be a man. It is that causes something to be a man, and it is only an account ( ), or "formula of being" ), that can describe . Now that we have elucidated what is, we will be able to understand how the philosophical framework that has been observed so far is used to de ne the most important key word, homoousion, in the Nicene creed. In the Epistle the author writes:
Whatever accounts ( ) show the substance of Paul will apply to the other men as well. Those who are described with the same "formula of being" ) 20 are consubstantial ( ) with one another" (2,24-26).
The substance ( ) in this context is neither the individual like the thing ( ) pointed out by proper names, nor the common as a sort of whole indicated by universal names, but a principle or essence by which all men are caused to be a man "in the same way ( )" (2,20). Therefore, homoousion means that the individuals have the same cause and essence, and are made to exist in the same way.
Secondly, when someone uses the proper name ( ) to refer to the individual thing ( ), the author says that he designates the particular nature ( ) subsisting in that thing. In that case, what kind of entity does that particular correspond to? It is, I think, some sort of whole in each individual, which corresponds to a bundle of the object's particular properties. In other words, such a as some kind of whole or integrity in the thing is the necessary condition of the possibility for anyone to indicate the individual thing, such as (18) (person)' (3,1-2), which causes it to be the individual or is 'the principle of individuation. '" 22 It should be noticed here that the could not actually exist without being individualized by the . It is by the addition of particular notes ( ) 23 that the conception of substance regarded as indeterminate leads to the recognition of concrete things. At the same time, however, the individuation through the could not be realized without the as a universal essence to be individualized. It is signi cant that both are complementary.
The Application to the Theory of the Trinity
So far we have found our author 1) developing an argument concerning the -distinction from the semantic level to the metaphysical level, and 2) emphasising the distinction between the unifying and causing ousia and individualizing hypostasis. In this phase of the argument, he transfers the philosophical framework and the principle of the di erentiation in the aforesaid speculation to "divine dogmas" ( ), namely the theory of the Trinity.
What should not be overlooked here is that in God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit cannot be described, for example, as "God," just as the universal name, e.g., "man," cannot describe but only indicates the common . Because, if my interpretation is not incorrect, it is only that can describe the , and the in itself is not God as a , but the cause of their being God.
24 Therefore, the -concept in the theological context can- Ep. 38, 3, [14] [15] [16] [17] . In this quotation from Job 1:1-2, Job is mentioned not as " " but as " ." (22) Z , Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa…, 78. (23) For example, "the name, the place," …and "the marks which reveal his character, and all such external adjuncts as will di erentiate him" (3, (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) .
(24) In this regard, however, "the author" explicitly emphasizes that our mind cannot depend upon "a de nitely prescribed conception ( )" about, for example, what "the being of the Father ( )" is, [sc. the of the Father], because "we are sure that it is beyond all concep-not be translated as "God," otherwise either unitarianism or tritheism would be introduced.
25
Keeping this in mind, then, what we have to confront is a sort of dilemma as below. On the one hand, the three Persons subsist as individuals. On the other hand, three Persons are, however, still unied and homoousioi, namely, one as nature and substance. So, if no substance can exist without its being in any hypostasis, it would be a sort of paradox to maintain that the divine substance subsists in its own hypostasis. Because the undivided substance would subsist in three hypostases, that is, should have been already divided into three. This paradox, which is expressed in the Epistle using a double oxymoron as "united separation and disunited connection," will be solved by the author, 1) through an illustration of the rainbow, 26 2) through exempli cations from the Scriptures and their exegeses, 27 and 3) implicitly through his philosophical strategy. In this article, the third solution is the most important. That is, just as (1) there should be, on the semantic level, the complementarity or interdependency between universal signi cation and particular reference, and (2) on the metaphysical tion" (3,33-36). However, on the other hand, the author merely and without any arguments presupposes that "the same account of Being Uncreated and Incomprehensible ( ) is to be attributed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Ghost" (3, (38) (39) (40) .
(25) In other words, the overestimation of three entails tritheism, on the other hand, the overemphasis on the one brings about unitarianism. In the la er case, rejection of the individuality of the Son or the Holy Spirit brings about Sabellianism, and denial of the deity of the Son entails subordinationism.
(26) For a natural scientists' explanations of the rainbow which Basil seems to borrow, cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae VII, 152f = Poseidonius, Frgm. 335. According to the epistle (section 5), that "which is disunited and at the same time connected" in the Holy Trinity can be explicated "by analogy from things which appear to our sense-perceptions," for example, the brilliancy of the rainbow which "is both continuous with itself ( ) and separated ( )" (5,25-26). (27) For example, the author refutes the wrong Christology based on Hebr. 1:3: If we regard a Person ( ) as "the con ux of the individual traits of each member of the Trinity ( )" (6,5-6), then "the Son has been formed by the individual traits ( ) of the Father" and "there no longer remains to the Father exclusively to be called 'unbego en ( )' in a sense peculiar to Himself alone" (6,16-17).
level, the complementarity between essence and individuality, so we should also nd out, (3) on the theological level, the interdependency between the divine essence ( ) and the individual . The (three Persons) cannot be God nor even be regarded as God without the , and, at the same time, the la er could not exist actually without the former.
To put it speci cally, the unifying relationship among three Persons is eventually developed as below.
1) "Every blessing ( ) which is bestowed on us by power divine" is ascribed to "the working of the Grace ( )" as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:11). (4, (2) (3) (4) 2) However, "this supply ( ) of blessings" does not take "its origin" from the Holy Spirit alone, but are brought about by the Onlybego en God ( ) as the source and cause ( ) through the Spirit (4,6-8). Additionally, in response to John 1:3, "all things were made by Him [the Son] and in Him cohere" (4, (11) (12) (13) . By the power of the Son "all things are brought into being from nonbeing" (4, (15) (16) (17) .
3) However, additionally, not "even by this power without a beginning ( )," but "there is a power which exists without generation or beginning" ( ), that is "the cause of the cause of all things that exist ( )" (4, (17) (18) (19) , namely the Father. 4) At the same time, "it is impossible for a man, if he has not been previously enlightened by the Spirit, to arrive at a conception of the Son" (4,21-22).
Some Interpretations about the Background of Basil's Trinitarian Thought
We have outlined the development of Basil's Trinitarian thought, and, by closely analyzing Ep. 38 in comparison with his other works before it, have come close to his nal stage, if this le er is his, or, if not, we have reached his limit. It may be promising, then, to proceed to the discussion about its philosophical background, in order to get a key to the understanding of the intricate argument. Indeed, many previous researchers have given various interpretations in regard to the question of the doctrines which lead the underlying Epistle's argument: among Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic doctrines, which plays a leading role? And the point here is, I think, how its concept of should be interpreted.
as the rst category, and qualities as the second category which are subdivided into a common quality ( ) and a particular quality ( ). For the Stoics, neither the underlying substratum nor the common qualities exist taken by themselves. Applying the Stoic to his own = (Adversus Eunomium I. 15, II.4, , Basil can logically ground the unity of the three hypostases on the unity of substance.
Drecoll, however, criticises the fact that Basil's distinction between and does not correspond with the Stoic contrast between and / . 33 Because, behind this Stoic contrast, there is the distinction between passive and active . In that case, Basil's concept of belongs to the realm of , not to the realm of . Therefore, in so far as Ep. 38 is concerned, the concept of cannot be interpreted as the inde nite substratum in the Stoic way, though, as a whole, the Stoic in uence upon Basil's Trinitarian thought is undeniable.
(3) The Aristotelian Background
In terms of the distinction between and in the present Epistle, its author insists that the individual cognitive note ( ) must be added to the inde nite concept of in order to recognize concrete individuals. According to Drecoll, this insistence suggests the Peripatetic background, especially the Aristotelian analysis of a de nition in Topica, and Hübner also clearly emphasizes its similarity to Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione.
However, assigning three to a common = a common species ( ) as an Aristotelian secondary substance in Categories and thus maintaining unity as members of a species, that is, taking the so-called "Aristotelian route," falls short of the more promising theory of the Trinity. Because, "the identi cation of the second substance in Categories" as an abstract and nominalistic universal "with the eidos of the central books of Metaphysics" is obviously questionable, unless an argument mediating between the two is developed in the way we interpreted it in 3.2. In addition, we need to balance "the input from Stoic logic with Aristotelian elements mediated by later philosophical sources," 34 as seen in the following. 
(4) The Synthetic or Eclectic Background in Late Ancient Philosophy
Finally, in contrast with the aforesaid approach, neither one particular author nor one particular school of thought, but late ancient synthetic interpreting developments of Aristotle's philosophy, which have to take into account some strand of non-Aristotelianism, need to be focused on. In particular, what needs to be noticed is a tendency to substitute the Aristotelian terminology for Stoic terminology in the logical realm from the late second century on. As a result, the view of Ep. 38 also cannot avoid becoming some kind of synthesis of the two theories; the Aristotelian and the Stoic. According to Zachhuber, on the one hand, the author holds names to indicate things ( ) in accordance with the Aristotelian theory. On the other hand, "the Stoic doctrine, too, seems to have le its traces in the Epistle 38 in so far as it recognises a relation of the names to universal and particular elements."
35 Additionally, the Platonic and Peripatetic concept of incorporeal forms combined with the Stoic notion of corporeal qualities, allows us nally to nd the conception of the universal or the common (the secondary substance in Aristotelian meaning) as the whole composed of the primary substances as its parts.
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This a ractive interpretation is exempli ed by several texts, for example, Categories (ch. 5, 2a14-17), De Interpretatione (ch. 7, 17a38-17b1), Porphyry's Isagoge (7, 4) , and Boethius' commentary (in de Int., II,7). And it is also in part similar to my interpretation. Concerning the authorship of Ep. 38, however, Zachhuber's insistence that the Epistle should be treated as documenting "the Cappadocian" teaching, neither Basilian nor Gregorian respectively, but collectively, 37 is unacceptable, because the concept of a "Cappadocian" position with li le di erence overestimates a common tradition in Cappadocians, and "blurs important di erences" 38 among them. In other words, the expression of "the Cappadocian author of the Epistle 38" is a rightly cautious reservation to avoid a clear-cut decision, but, at the same time, can also suggest abandonment of further investigation into the truth. (37) Ibid., 63. Zachhuber insists that "it does not appear that there is a clear-cut distinction to be made between Basil's and Gregory's approaches to the ousia-hupostasis distinction and the understanding of the homoousion" (ibid., 61).
(38) A , Nicaea and its Legacy…, 205, n. 60.
Epilogue
As the Stoic in uence upon Basil is undeniable (as seen in 4), if the author regards the common ousia not as the indeterminate substratum in the Stoic way, but as the universal species in the Aristotelian way in the Epistle 38, then he is not Basil, but Gregory of Nyssa. However, this contrast between Basil and Gregory by means of a di erentiation among philosophical backgrounds is somewhat schematically oversimpli ed. Both Basil and the author of the Epistle are more exible and complicated, not only philosophically, but also theologically (as seen in 1). In other words, whether the real author of Ep. 38 is Basil or Gregory, I am convinced that clarifying this le er's argument could cast light on some philosophical aspects of Basil's Trinitarian thought. Now that we have given a general overview of the development of his theology, we can nally say with certainty that Basil was one of the fathers of pro-Nicene theology, no more and no less.
SUMMARY
In my article, some interpretations about the backgrounds of Basil's Trinitarian teaching are brie y presented. On the basis of this outline, some arguments on various stages of the development of his Trinitarian thought will be speci cally outlined and compared. Then the argument in the main part of Epistle 38 will be analyzed in detail in order to exemplify the philosophical framework and strategy of this Cappadocian author's Trinitarian theology. Finally, some interpretations about the philosophical backgrounds of Basil's Trinitarian teaching are outlined. In the course of this argument, the article aims to cast light on some philosophical aspects of his Trinitarian thought.
